"John Dallman" wrote in message >news:memo.20191116150543.1784D@jgd.cix.co.uk...
Joseph "Beppo" Schmid was in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence from the
beginning of 1938 to late 1942. The intelligence used to plan the Battle
of Britain was very defective, and his performance as a ground commander
and in the Defence of the Reich campaign was unimpressive. His primary
quality seemed to be his close friendship with Goering.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schmid
From what I've learned about the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe, despite >their high losses, had all but exhausted the RAF. The British pilots were >getting so little sleep that they nodded off at the controls and shuffled >around like zombies. By the time Der Fuhrer threw in the towel, the RAF >hadn't so much "won" the Battle of Britain as the Luftwaffe LOST it: >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCu7IT81gh8&t=21m22s
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that >something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were >sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
Joseph "Beppo" Schmid was in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence from the beginning of 1938 to late 1942. The intelligence used to plan the Battle
of Britain was very defective, and his performance as a ground commander
and in the Defence of the Reich campaign was unimpressive. His primary quality seemed to be his close friendship with Goering. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schmid
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
On 11/16/2019 8:15 PM, SolomonW wrote:
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:To make it safe for the shipping they did have, obviously! :P
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that
something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were
sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
Slightly more realistically in Hitler's mind it was probably to punish >Britain for not surrendering and to scare them into doing so.
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Unfortunately, many (not all) generalist history books still rely on the beliefs expressed by the leaders in 1940 rather than on more recent, and
more comprehensive, research.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 15:15:35 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that >>something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were >>sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was >>the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the >>point of this air war?
He wouldn't have known the RAF figures, sure, but he knew the
Luftwaffe figures weren't sustainable ...
but afaict he believed the
RAF losses were equally unsustainable,
Hitler certainly didn't seem to believe the losses were sustainable in
the face of prep for Barbarossa.
What was the point of the BoB from the Nazi PoV?
I am not entirely sure the Nazis had a clear agenda, or not a clear
single agenda.
I *think* there is evidence that Hitler suffered a version of 'victory disease' and believed that he could actually stage Sealion ... which
the Kriegsmarine, at least, had a pretty good idea they couldn't, and
tried repeatedly to tell High Command and Hitler, who completely
ignored them.
I *think* that there is also evidence that Hitler believed that the
BoB and the threat of Sealion would force the UK to negotiate a peace favourable to Germany
even though there isn't any real evidence that
the UK would ever have considered such
and a lot of historical
evidence to suggest the exact opposite.
I am pretty sure that Hitler had some inkling that leaving an
unconquered or at least unemasculated UK at his rear for Barbarossa
was not a good idea ... after all, the reason for the attack in the
West was because he believed that a two front European war was largely
what had led to Germany's defeat in WW1. Of course, this notion was
impacted by the 'victory disease' and by the fact that the BoB wasn't
seen to be a clear German defeat *at the time* so he eventually seems
to have convinced himself that leaving an unconquered UK in his rear
was no biggie ... an unfortunate delusion.
... so he eventually seems to have convinced himself
that leaving an unconquered UK in his rear was no
biggie ... an unfortunate delusion.
From what I've learned about the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe, despite >their high losses, had all but exhausted the RAF. The British pilots were >getting so little sleep that they nodded off at the controls and shuffled >around like zombies. By the time Der Fuhrer threw in the towel, the RAF >hadn't so much "won" the Battle of Britain as the Luftwaffe LOST it: >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCu7IT81gh8&t=21m22s
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of
operational needs.
The RAF pilot total *increased* every month during the Battle of
Britain - the Luftwaffe pilot total *decreased* every month in the
same time period.
RAF Fighter Pilots: ~800 in July, 950 in August, ~1050 in Spetember,
~1200 in October, ~1400 in November)
RAF Pilot Losses: 68 in Julyt, 176 in August, 123 in September, 120 in >October (Total = 487)
Luftwaffe Fighter Pilots: ~500 in July, ~450 in August, ~375 in >September-October-November.
Luftwaffe Pilot Losses: 348 in July, 993 in August, 829 in September,
492 in October (Total = 2662)
The number of operational fighters available to the RAF in the SE and
S operational areas remained much the same during the Battle ... and
these were first line Hurricanes and Spitfires ... while the number of >operational fighters available to the Luftwaffe (which included duds
like the Me-110) decreased dramatically during the same period.
RAF Fighters: ~850 in July, ~900 in August-September, ~800 in >October-November.
Luftwaffe Fighters: ~800 in July, ~750 in August, ~600 in >September-October-November.
Then, when you look at the number of sorties flown per day, the RAF
flew as many as 10 for every one the Luftwaffe flew except during some
weeks in august when they flew between 30-50% more. Giving them much
more bang for their pounds.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20
hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in
strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
Even so, the Air Ministry had realised by early 1941 that the BoB had
been won, though the magnitude of the victory wasn't fully understood
til German records could be examined after the war.
Unfortunately, many (not all) generalist history books still rely on
the beliefs expressed by the leaders in 1940 rather than on more
recent, and more comprehensive, research.
Not a lot of coastal shipping to protect after the French surrender!
U-Boats and the KM surface raiders, on the other hand ...
Slightly more realistically in Hitler's mind it was probably to punish >>Britain for not surrendering and to scare them into doing so.
Yes, I suspect this was an important factor, though I am not sure the >evidence is conclusive enough to say that it was the only factor.
As I said in an above post, I strongly suspect that form of 'victory
disease' was an important factor in Hitler's thinking about the BoB
and Sealion.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of >>operational needs.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
I agree with this too. The other issue is that time was not he felt on his >side, the longer he waited, the more powerful the USSR would be.
Who else but WSC could have said "we shall fight
them on the beaches, we shall never surrender"?
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:39:18 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
Not a lot of coastal shipping to protect after the French surrender! >>U-Boats and the KM surface raiders, on the other hand ...
Are you talking about the British or Germans? If the latter don't
forget that Germany still had the power to evacuate 1/4 million people >(somewhat comparable to Dunkirk) from the Baltic States even in 1945.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada.
The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
(Many of whom ended up in Canada and later the US)
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada.
The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of >>operational needs.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20
hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in
strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the >>time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
Interesting - what's your source on this? I've read Churchill's 6
volume history and didn't see any mention of that (those books were
written mostly 1948-52 if that helps)
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
Even so, the Air Ministry had realised by early 1941 that the BoB had
been won, though the magnitude of the victory wasn't fully understood
til German records could be examined after the war.
In fairness Churchill spoke many times on the RAF and he definitely
knew that praising them was very good for public morale.
Are you talking about the British or Germans? If the latter don't
forget that Germany still had the power to evacuate 1/4 million people >>(somewhat comparable to Dunkirk) from the Baltic States even in 1945.
Indeed.
Two words.
Wilhelm Gustloff.
Sure, the Germans had merchant ships in the Baltic. They were *needed*
in the Baltic to ship, amongst other things, Swedish Iron ore and
supplies for Barbarossa.
They didn't risk them in the English Channel or North Sea where the RN
would have trashed them.
Phil
But Britain was already training pilots and, as you can see from the
figures I provided, the number of Fighter Pilots increased overall
every month ... by hundreds.
What's interesting is that this figure doesn't cover the actual number
of Pilots involved ... the overall figure (Pilots flying at least one
sortie) is 2937 ... a thousand more than the 1400 November figure and
the 487 losses.
Figures are all available online.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20 >>>hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in >>>strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't >>>know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the >>>time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
Interesting - what's your source on this? I've read Churchill's 6
volume history and didn't see any mention of that (those books were
written mostly 1948-52 if that helps)
Well, the Air Ministry, as noted below, realised that the BoB had been
won in 1941.
I guess Churchill didn't emphasise it partly because it didn't suit
the heroic narrative he was selling in those books and partly because
he wrote them (IIRC) without specific reference (in them) to any
primary or even secondary sources
Indeed. And selling the heroic myth of 'The Few' played as well after
the war.
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019 10:58:13 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
But Britain was already training pilots and, as you can see from the >>figures I provided, the number of Fighter Pilots increased overall
every month ... by hundreds.
What's interesting is that this figure doesn't cover the actual number
of Pilots involved ... the overall figure (Pilots flying at least one >>sortie) is 2937 ... a thousand more than the 1400 November figure and
the 487 losses.
Figures are all available online.
Is that the entire RAF or is it just 11 Fighter Group? (The one
covering SE England especially London)
On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:48:26 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada. >>The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >>and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >>pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
True, to a point.
The EATS was supposed to train 50,000 a year ... 28,000 in the
Dominions and Colonies and the remaining 22,000 in the UK.
So it was the UK cohort of the EATS who bolstered the pilot numbers consistently during the BoB.
Phil McGregor
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019 11:02:30 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:48:26 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada. >>>The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >>>and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >>>pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
True, to a point.
The EATS was supposed to train 50,000 a year ... 28,000 in the
Dominions and Colonies and the remaining 22,000 in the UK.
So it was the UK cohort of the EATS who bolstered the pilot numbers
consistently during the BoB.
Phil McGregor
Reading the Wiki, I doubt that it was UK EATS, the first of these EATS was >sent to Britain in Oct 1941.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/British_Commonwealth_Air_Training_Plan
"The United Kingdom was considered an unsuitable location for air training, >due to the possibility of enemy attack, the strain caused by wartime
traffic at airfields and the unpredictable weather, so the plan called for >the facilities in the Dominions to train British and each other's
aircrews."
I unclear where these pilots came from, but I think they may have been >existing pilots who were retrained. Reading the reports, it appears that >their lack of experience was a problem. Although Britain had more pilots
and planes in numbers at the end of the Battle of Britain, I doubt many
were of the same quality as at the start.
During one of the raids a German bomber got lost and managed to drop
his load on Dublin destroying the synagogue there. The next day De
Valera called in the German ambassador and told him he WOULD pay for
the rebuilding of the synagogue and if he wouldn't he would call
Churchill who undoubtedly would. The synagogue had their centenary in
1992 and it is said the rabbi took great pleasure in telling onlookers
that they were worshipping in the only synagogue ever built by the
Third Reich!
I'm pretty sure it includes the two Groups facing the Luftwaffe as
they are the figures listed for BoB RAF pilot numbers, 11 Group (7
Spitfire, 14 Hurricane and 2 Defiant Squadrons) in the SE and 10 Group
(5 Hurricane and 3 Spitfire Squadrons, plus a Gladiator Squadron) in
the SW, which was also engaged, though not as heavily.
The German figures are for BoB Fighter squadrons afaict.
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not
nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >said.
Had the British taken and held Narvik ...
...I have no doubt the Brits would have invaded
Northern Sweden sometime between 1941-43 to take
the iron fields...
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not
nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >said.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
Had the British taken and held Narvik ...
The Allies did take Narvik (I write "Allies"
because the French _Chasseurs Alpins_ were
heavily involved).
However, after the fall of southern Norway
to the Germans, and with the collapse of
France, Narvik was deemed untenable.
I wonder though - given the terrain, could a
determined garrison hold out? The Allies would
also keep northern Norway, which has effects on
Finland; it would also secure the convoy route
to Murmansk. And here's a big question: would
the Axis be able to hold the Petsamo nickel
mines, and how important was Petsamo nickel?
...I have no doubt the Brits would have invaded
Northern Sweden sometime between 1941-43 to take
the iron fields...
Very unlikely. By that time, Germany had the Briey
fields in France, Britain would not want to
force Sweden into the Axis, and German forces
operating through and with Sweden would easily
recapture the Kiruna mines _and_ take Narvik.
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 19:55:45 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets who
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets whoLack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were >>>> sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there >>>is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
In 1941, they were throwing in pilots that had almost no training and from >what I read it was only towards the end of ww2 that Russian pilot training
in hours started equaling Western training times.
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where
the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 21:01:56 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets whoLack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were >>>>> sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there >>>>is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>>>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>>>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>>>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>>>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
In 1941, they were throwing in pilots that had almost no training and from >>what I read it was only towards the end of ww2 that Russian pilot training >>in hours started equaling Western training times.
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
My reference to 22 June 1941 (which I presume most here know was the
day the Germans invaded Russia) was simply that the Red Air Force lost roughly 1000 planes that day many on the ground. This had the result
that during the 1941 they mostly flew whatever they had available and
many of these were NOT up to 1940-41 standards - some of these dated
back to the 1920s.
The first Soviet "airborne" operations were in fact during the 1941-42 counteroffensive where troops were dropped behind German lines to join
up with the partisans. The story is that a common method of
"paratrooping" was for the plane to fly as low to the ground as
possible and for the men to jump into as deep a snowbank as they could
spot from the air - WITHOUT PARACHUTES. I've read stories that have to
be apocryphal as to how many jumped that way but there are too many
stories of that sort for this not to have been used in a few cases.
There is no suggestion this was ever attempted other than in the
deepest of winter.
To me it seems too "Bartholomew Bandy-ish" to have ever been a
widespread practice. (Apologies to those unfamiliar with Donald Jack's
hero)
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
On Sun, 24 Nov 2019 13:46:08 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where
the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
When was this battle? If it happened at all it had to be somewhere
near the Elbe in 1945 and as I said the Red Air Force was pretty
competent by then.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
But is adjacent to northern Norway, and very
distant from the rest of Finland - and also
adjacent to the USSR.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
Read the article (though preferably replacing the for-profit Wikiwand
address with the corresponding Wikipedia one). It's in Serbia almost
exactly 75 years ago.
It's also P-38s, which weren't really suitable dogfighters, against
YAK-9s. Euro Theatre P-38s were not given to the best American pilots at
that point-there are P-51s all over the European skies instead.
On 11/24/2019 12:03 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
On Sun, 24 Nov 2019 13:46:08 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where >>> the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
When was this battle? If it happened at all it had to be somewhere
near the Elbe in 1945 and as I said the Red Air Force was pretty
competent by then.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
Read the article (though preferably replacing the for-profit Wikiwand
address with the corresponding Wikipedia one).
It's in Serbia almost
exactly 75 years ago.
It's also P-38s, which weren't really suitable dogfighters, against
YAK-9s. Euro Theatre P-38s were not given to the best American pilots at
that point-there are P-51s all over the European skies instead.
There are stories of how gliders killed every man on board when they tried
to land a jeep or anti-tank gun by glider and the moorings in the glider
gave way - even when they WEREN'T under German fire.
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